
Modern social science scholarship on revolution is vast and diverse. Davies (1962) and Gurr (1968) are two scholars who are mainly credited for the development of what is known as the sociopsychological theory of revolution. Individual behavior takes front seat in these theories. According to Davies, revolutions occur when long-term socioeconomic development is followed by short-term and sharp economic reversals. More specifically, as people experience improving economic conditions over time they come to expect that they will be able to obtain more and more. When the sharp reversal in economic fortune comes, ability to obtain goods declines while the peoples’ expectations as to what they believe they should be able to obtain continue to rise. The gap between what people are able to obtain and what they believe they should be able to obtain grows and turns into a crisis of rising expectations. And unhappy, unsatisfied, and frustrated individuals then resort to political violence. While Davies’ J-curve theory of revolution seems to have some value in explaining revolution, it does not clearly embrace political reasons as explanatory variables. Not all revolutionaries are affected by economic woes. Despotism, corruption, lack of political freedom, and issues of political participation may well be high in the minds of the middle classes and urban dwellers before and during revolutions. Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation refers to individuals’ perceptions of the discrepancy between the standard of living that they believe deserving and the standard of living they are actually capable of achieving. When the deprivation is intense, anger, frustration, and political violence follow. Gurr (1968) also includes political variables such as legitimacy and institutionalization to explain civil strife. However, while deprivation could be a factor in affecting revolution, Gurr (1968) does not clearly connect this variable with its possible cause, the economic development process.
Johnson’s (1966) theory of equilibrium asserts that value-coordinated behavior among the people of a given society leads to political stability. Specifically, socialization helps the perpetuation of values and norms, which lead to the presence of trust and confidence among the people, a moral community. Government also ought to be legitimized for the societal values and norms to hold. To the extent that social, economic, and political systems stay in balance and change in equal proportions as well as evolutionarily, political stability would be guaranteed. Revolutions occur only when disequilibrium in value congruence exists. Political leaders could re-stabilize the system by making some reforms. Otherwise, revolution (facilitated by accelerators such as military mutiny and guerrilla warfare) will break out and force the system to change to a new equilibrium. On the surface, Johnson’s argument seems logically consistent. However,
Johnson (1966) seems to overstate the existence of equilibrium in social systems. For instance, can we really say that there is value congruence among people in all kinds of regimes? In traditional societies, the peasantry could be exploited by the landed classes, but the former class (although resentful of its way of life) may still stay peaceful for a long period of time. In other words, the absence of violence may not imply the presence of value congruence. Put differently, Johnson seems to conflate value congruence or equilibrium with political stability.
Huntington (1968) relies on modernization theory to explain social revolutions. According to him, “Revolution is . . . an aspect of modernization” (p. 265). His main argument is that modernization, specifically social mobilization and economic development, leads to political awareness. Consequently, the people, being educated and urbanized, start to demand greater political participation. If political institutions do not allow or establish mechanisms for the incorporation of the mobilized people, political violence, including revolution, is possible. In other words, similar to
Johnson’s (1966) thesis, revolution is caused by the gap between political mobilization of the people and the inability of political institutions (or their failure to continuously adapt) to absorb the mobilized masses into politics. In addition, not inconsistent to
Davies’ (1962) and
Gurr’s (1968) analyses,
Huntington (1968) also contends that the gap between people’s expectations and satisfactions (aspects of social mobilization and economic development, respectively) can be used as a measure of political instability. In effect,
Huntington (1968) links the equilibrium theory of Johnson and the sociopsychological theories of Davies and Gurr by stating that the gap between expectations and satisfactions is caused by the absence of opportunities for social mobility and adaptable political institutions (
Goldstone, 1994).
Huntington (1968) is credited for bringing the importance of political institutions in the explanation of revolution. However, one can identify at least two problems in Huntington’s arguments. First, he seems to suggest that social mobilization and economic development independently and directly affect revolution. It seems to me that the causal arrow should point from economic development to social mobilization to revolution. In other words, economic development seems to influence social mobilization, and social mobilization would potentially lead to revolution. Second, Huntington seems to overstate the importance of political participation. For instance, he credits Leninism and Lenin’s communist party for making possible the political participation of millions of Soviets. It seems, to Huntington, the more people participate in a political system (and regardless of the regime type), the better. However, as
Almond and Verba (1963) argue, too much popular participation may, in fact, interfere with the tasks of governance as well as the daily activities of the people.
Tilly (1978,
1994) uses what some refer to as a political-conflict model and relies on political variables, including the pursuit of power among groups in a society, to explain collective action in general and revolution in particular. He argues that individual anger and frustration alone cannot lead to revolution. He contends that a major reason for the promotion of revolutions and collective violence is the concentration of power in national states. Such a concentration of power by states would lead to multiple sovereignty. Multiple sovereignty, according to Tilly, occurs when other groups in a society are organized to challenge the power of the state. Tilly’s argument is consistent with
Trotsky’s (1932) idea of dual power or sovereignty (e.g., the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in Russia) that inevitably occurs during revolutions. Tilly argues that groups’ possession of sufficient resources and strong organizations are key determinants for waging and winning revolutionary conflicts. Only when a single sovereignty, be it the government or a challenger, prevails will the revolutionary conflict be over. Tilly is credited for using political variables in explaining the process of revolution. However, Tilly not only seems to overstate the impact of political variables, but he also tends to slight or understate the importance of economic issues and factors. In addition, given Tilly’s distinction between revolutionary situation (multiple sovereignty) and revolutionary outcome (power transfer), his theory seems to apply more to guerrilla-based revolutions, such as those of the 1959 Cuban Revolution. As
Wickham-Crowley (1991) argues, the onsets of the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution of 1917, for instance, came before political organizations and resources were established and acquired.
Using what she calls structural theory,
Skocpol (1979) argues that the literature on revolution ignores the importance of politics in explaining social revolution. She forcefully contends that the state must be considered a central factor as the cause of revolution. Relying on comparative case studies of the French Revolution of 1789, Russian Revolution of 1917, and Chinese Revolution of 1911-1949 (and four other contrasting cases), she argues that the structural position and power of the state internationally, the nature of the state’s relationship with the dominant classes, and class struggle among groups in society play major roles in bringing about social revolutions. International competition (both political and economic), war defeats, fiscal problems, independence of landlord’s power or lack thereof, and autonomous peasant uprising are key in creating revolutionary situations. Skocpol is credited for using the state as a variable in explaining revolution. However, several problems exist in her theory. First, revolutions do not always occur after war defeats (
Arjomand, 1986;
Goldstone, 1994). The French Revolution of 1789, the Chinese Revolution of 1911, and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 are cases in point. Second, according to
Arjomand (1986), fiscal crisis does not always precede state collapse. The Shah regime in Iran collapsed in the 1979 revolution without fiscal crisis. According to
Arendt (1977), the collapse of the French state was predicted by Montesquieu 40 years before 1789. Montesquieu based his prediction on how widespread the loss of political authority had become in France in particular and Europe in general.
Arendt (1977) adds that the main reason for the loss of political authority in Europe in the 18th century was the decline of religious and traditional values, which were consequences of the modern age. Thus, fiscal crisis was perhaps more of a triggering factor than the main reason for the collapse of the French state. Third, the structural or power position of the states does not always matter for revolutions. Revolutions have come in both relatively powerful states (e.g., France and Russia) and relatively weaker states (e.g., Iran and Cuba). And, as Gurr and
Goldstone (1991) argue, states can and do have choices and are not, thus, helplessly constrained by international (economic and/or military) influences and structures. In addition, although external factors could trigger and facilitate the onset and success of revolutions, revolution seems, as
Walt (1994) argues, to be more of a national phenomenon. Fourth, state breakdown does not always precede revolution (see also
Wickham-Crowley, 1991). Examples of this are the Chinese Revolution of 1949 and the Cuban Revolution of 1959. The Kuomintang and Batista regimes in China and Cuba, respectively, fell only after being defeated in revolutionary wars. Moreover, Eastern Europe’s socialist states did not collapse before, but during or after, the onset of popular uprisings. Fifth, peasant uprising, autonomous or not, is not always necessary for the onset of revolution (
Arjomand, 1986;
Gurr & Goldstone, 1991). A case in point is the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Sixth, dominant classes were not always against the state during revolution. A case in point is the Russian Revolution of 1917. Seventh, related to some of the foregoing critiques is that Skocpol’s theory does not explain all revolutions. In other words, as she herself has admitted, Skocpol has not developed a general theory of revolution (
Burawoy, 1989;
Kiser & Hechter, 1991;
Sewell, 1996;
Wickham-Crowley, 1991).
Goldstone (1991,
1994) uses what he refers to as a demographic/structural model to explain state breakdown and revolution. He argues that rapid population growth can lead to the main issues that
Skocpol (1979) contends to have led to revolution, state breakdowns, elite conflicts, and popular uprisings. More specifically, population growth can lead to rising prices or inflation, which undermines the finances of states. It can also create economic conflicts among the elites as they have to compete for limited opportunities. Population growth can also lead to unemployment and underemployment. Combined with other factors such as the effects of the global economy and superpower politics, population growth increases the chances for revolution. However, at least two problems can be identified in
Goldstone’s (1991,
1994) thesis. First, population growth itself is, to a large extent, a function of socioeconomic development, specifically, advances in science and technology. Hygiene and proper nutrition have been the key ingredients of mortality decline and population growth (see
McKeown, 1976;
Riley, 2001). If, indeed, population growth affects revolution, this is because it is affected by socioeconomic development. Moreover, the impact of population growth on economic growth rate is inconclusive. While some scholars argue that population growth has positive impact on economic growth rate (
Kuznets, 1960;
Simon, 1981), others contend that it has a negative effect (
Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1990). Still others assert that population has, on average, no significant impact on economic growth rate (
Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla, 2003). Second, rising prices tend to be part of the general cycle in the economy and more of a triggering factor than a major condition of revolution.
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